History of CCTV
In 1995, the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard MP, published a document “CCTV - Looking out for you”. It emphasized that CCTV should not become “a cure looking for an illness” and stated that “too often CCTV is perceived as the 'cure' before clearly identifying the problems which it is supposed to deal with”. To illustrate these issues, the document contained two scenarios – both involving local authority proposals to install a CCTV system.
The first scenario related to one (anonymous) borough where there appeared to be a high rate of vandalism to cars, and this level of crime “was believed to be driving people from using the town centre” and it was thought that “CCTV would be the best solution”. However, research showed that “the damage was concentrated on particular days of the week” and “most commonly appeared during one period of time on those days". Further investigation showed that the higher rate of damage was “caused by market traders when they set up early in the morning” and that implementation of a “town centre CCTV would have been an expensive non-solution”.
The second case study concerned the CCTV system installed at Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Centre. Here a police superintendent explained that, prior to the installation of CCTV, a “revised style of pro-active policing” was introduced. This resulted in a decrease of crime from 13,500 incidents in 1991 to 4,500 in 1993 and the introduction of CCTV reduced crime statistics further to 2,381 offences per year. The conclusion drawn was that “the true success of CCTV” was linked “to a strategy of pro-active policing and other positive initiatives which are inextricably linked to the use of CCTV”.
The Home Office guidance then outlined the basic components of a successful installation of a CCTV system; ingredients that are repeated in the Commissioner's draft Code and ACPO's Strategy. These components, which provide a useful checklist of actions to be taken prior to purchase, involve:
· a multi-agency approach to produce a CCTV system specification that involves all stakeholders likely to have an interest in the effectiveness of the system (e.g. police, local authorities, prosecutors, car park operators, residents groups, media representatives and representatives of retailers, restauranteurs and publicans). This approach will lead to the identification of the common social problems that CCTV aims to reduce (e.g. vandalism, shoplifting, drunkenness, burglary, pick pocketing, disorderly behaviour) and to an assessment of alternative solutions that don't need a CCTV system installed (e.g. better lighting, neighbourhood watch, improved communications with police, security patrols, no tolerance to graffiti, bye-laws re drinking, barrier entry car parks).
· a clear understanding of how and why the procurement of a CCTV system would be the best solution to mitigate the impact of the identified social problems (e.g. by providing a deterrence to the targeted behaviour or evidence that can be used in Court), and how CCTV will be co-ordinated with other initiatives (e.g. policing and anti-social behaviour strategies).
· the identification of the technical requirements from the system specification. This ensures that a procured CCTV system would have the functionality to deliver measurable results in relation to the identified problems (e.g. the system operates under the required lighting conditions; cameras have the correct zoom functionality; colours are reproduced accurately; evidential issues are resolved by the correct choice of monitors, cameras or storage devices).
· a business case that specifies the outcomes or deliverables to demonstrate that the CCTV system will be (or continues to be) a cost-effective solution to the identified social problems.
· careful consideration of staffing and operational issues (e.g. management, control room procedures, staff training, disclosure procedures, subject access procedures) and public relations issues (e.g. reports to Councillors, fair processing notices; press and public liaison) to maintain public confidence in the system.
Assessing the Impact of CCTV
The 1995 guidance from the Home Office appears to have been ignored in the rush to spend the £210 million the Government made available for the capital spend on CCTV systems between 1994 and 2003. This conclusion is apparent from a Home Office Research Study (“Assessing the impact of CCTV”, Report no. 292, Feb 2005) which studied 13 CCTV systems that were installed during this period.
Although the Home Office research contained a caveat not to come to “too simplistic a conclusion” about the effectiveness of CCTV in general, there is no mistaking its central message. The research report notes that: “It would be easy to conclude from the information presented in this report that CCTV is not effective: the majority of the schemes evolved did not reduce crime and even where there was a reduction, this was mostly not due to CCTV; nor did CCTV schemes make people feel safer, much less change their behaviour”.
This rather frank statement is accompanied with pithy explanations in relation to the management and procurement of CCTV systems studied by the researchers.
- “Many projects did not have clear objectives” and that the general perception was that “CCTV was a good thing”. Sometimes installation of a CCTV created “demands by neighboring towns to catch up” and the “existence of funding for CCTV created pressure to bid for it”.
- “Many schemes relied too heavily on technical consultants whose work was not scrutinized, largely because no one had the qualification to question what was done”. Since “a consultant was dispensed with in many cases, planners were unable to challenge the technical sales pitch of equipment suppliers”.
- “Some systems failed to engage properly with end-users, most notably the police” and this resulted in “a loss of interest in the system and a reluctance to use the evidence supplied by the cameras”.
The research also noted that “there was a lack of realism about what could be expected from CCTV” and that “in short, it was oversold – by successive governments – as the answer (indeed magic bullet)”. The researchers commented that “few seeking a share of the available funding saw it necessary to demonstrate CCTV's effectiveness” and “it was rarely obvious why CCTV was the best response to crime in particular circumstances”. There was “a tendency to put up cameras and expect impressive results, ignoring the challenge of making what is quite a complex measure work, and failing to define what exactly the CCTV system was expected to do”.
The research also noted positive items about CCTV. For example, in the 13 systems evaluated, crime had decreased in 6 areas whereas the increase in 7 areas covered by CCTV could not be attributed to the CCTV system. CCTV had less effect on impulsive crime (e.g. alcohol-related) but had a measurable effect on premeditated crime (e.g. car theft) and there was evidence to suggest that CCTV could assist where specific problems had been identified (e.g. areas where drug dealing was prevalent or which were associated with “acquisitive crime” such as theft). Fixed areas with specific problems (e.g. car-parks) were generally a CCTV success story.
The research noted that technical issues such as camera coverage, lighting and location were important to the effectiveness of the CCTV system but not if camera density had reached saturation point. Members of the public worried less about crime in the areas covered by CCTV, but “knowing that cameras were installed in the area did not necessarily lead to reinforced feelings of security among respondents”. Above all, procurement of a CCTV system which had been integrated with other crime reduction policies (and which involved police, retailers, community wardens, publicans etc) worked when installation included consideration of the components identified in the 1995 guidance.
